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This paper examines non-Ricardian effects of government spending shocks in the Chilean 
economy. We first provide evidence on those effects based on vector autoregressions. We 
then show that such evidence can be accounted for by a model that features: (i) a sizeable 
share of non-Ricardian households (i.e. households which do not make use of financial 
markets and just consume their current labor income); (ii) nominal price and wage 
rigidities; (iii) an inflation targeting scheme, and (iv) a structural balance fiscal rule that 
represents the particular Chilean fiscal rule. The model is estimated employing Bayesian 
techniques. Finally, we use model simulations to demonstrate the countercyclical effects of 





Este documento examina los efectos no ricardianos de shocks de gasto del gobierno en la 
economía chilena. En primer lugar, proporciona evidencia basada en vectores 
autorregresivos. Luego, muestra que esos efectos pueden ser explicados por un modelo que 
incorpora: (i) una proporción considerable de hogares no ricardianos, es decir, hogares que 
no hacen uso de los mercados financieros y apenas consumen sus ingresos de trabajo 
actual, (ii) rigideces nominales de precios y salarios, (iii) un esquema de metas de inflación, 
y (iv) una regla fiscal de balance estructural que refleja particularmente la regla fiscal 
chilena. El modelo se estima utilizando técnicas bayesianas. Por último, se utilizan modelos 
de simulación para demostrar los efectos contracíclicos de la regla fiscal chilena, en 
comparación con una regla de déficit cero. 
 
                                                 
This paper was presented during the XIV Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, “Fiscal Policy and 
Macroeconomic Performance,” held on 21-22 October 2010 in Santiago. We acknowledge the superb 
research assistance provided by Carlos Aguirre. We thank our discussant Günter Coenen and conference 
participants for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Natalia Gallardo for providing us data from the 
household financial survey carried out by the Central Bank of Chile. The analysis and conclusions of the 
authors do not imply similar opinions either from the Central Bank of Chile's Board or other members of the 
staff. The usual disclaimer applies. Emails: lfcespedes@uai.cl; jfornero@bcentral.cl; jgali@crei.cat. 
 1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the eﬀects of government spending shocks in the Chilean economy. The
study of the eﬀects of those shocks in an emerging market economy is of special interest because of
the potential importance in such an economy of non-Ricardian households, i.e. households which
do not own any assets nor have any liabilities and just consume their current labor income.1 The
existence of non-Ricardian households has been pointed to as a key ingredient in the transmission
mechanism of government spending shocks in some developed economies. There are several factors
that may explain non-Ricardian behavior including myopia and lack of access to capital markets.
The importance of such behavior is likely to be even greater in less developed economies.
To study the eﬀects of government spending shocks in an economy like the Chilean one is also
interesting because of its signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and trade openness. The size of the ﬁscal multiplier
generally depends on the response of monetary policy and the degree of ﬂexibility of the exchange
rate. In particular, economies with less ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are likely to exhibit larger
ﬁscal multipliers, as the exchange rate regime limits the potential oﬀsetting eﬀects due to the
response of the interest rate and the exchange rate to a government spending shock. Recently,
Ilzetzki et al. (2011) have pointed out that cumulative ﬁscal multipliers in ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes are positive and signiﬁcant, whereas in ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are basically zero. In
the period of study, monetary policy was characterized by the existence of an explicit commitment
to an inﬂation target. In terms of the exchange rate regime, the Chilean economy moved from an
exchange rate band in the nineties towards a ﬂexible exchange rate since 2000.
We start our work by presenting empirical evidence on the macroeconomic eﬀects of government
spending shocks for the Chilean economy. First, we present evidence based on vector autoregressive
(VAR) models that indicates that the ﬁscal multiplier is positive and large in the Chilean economy.
Moreover, the positive consumption multiplier that emerges from this VAR analysis points to the
importance of that variable in generating the large GDP multiplier, and suggests the presence of
non-Ricardian eﬀects. Secondly, we develop a small open economy model to study the channels
through which these shocks are transmitted to the economy. The model features Ricardian and
non-Ricardian households along the lines of Galí et al. (2007) and Coenen et al. (2008). The
model is calibrated and estimated for the Chilean economy. For this purpose we model explicitly
the ﬁscal framework under which ﬁscal policy has been conducted in Chile known as the structural
balance rule.
The Chilean ﬁscal rule ties total government spending to structural revenues. Structural rev-
enues correspond to the sum of cycle-adjusted tax revenues and copper-related ﬁscal revenues
evaluated at what could be considered a long-term copper price. Under this ﬁscal rule, government
spending plus a structural ﬁscal surplus target must be equal to permanent (structural) revenues.
Shocks to GDP (deviations from potential output) and to copper prices that aﬀect transitorily
ﬁscal revenues do not alter the path for government spending (path that is only aﬀected by changes
in potential output and the long-term price of copper). For example, the rule implies that if ef-
fective copper prices are transitorily above the estimated long-term copper price, the government
saves the amount of copper-related ﬁscal revenues associated to this transitory copper price shock.2
When oﬃcially implemented in 2001, the government announced a structural ﬁscal surplus target
equivalent to one percent of GDP (i.e., structural revenues minus government expenditure equals
1See, e.g. , Campbell & Mankiw (1991), Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al. (2007).
2Potential output and long-term copper price are determined by two committees of experts independent of the
government. See Frankel (2011) for a description of the Chilean ﬁscal rule.
1one percent of GDP). We show that the speciﬁcation of a ﬁscal policy rule that approximates the
Chilean rule leads to consumption and output ﬁscal multipliers that are positive in the short run,
in a way consistent with the evidence.3
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents VAR evidence on non-Ricardian
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy for the Chilean case. Section 3 introduces a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model for Chile.4 The model is calibrated and estimated, and results are reported in
Section 5. Numerical simulations of the estimated model are presented in Section 6. Therein we
examine impulse response functions and dynamic ﬁscal multipliers. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Some Evidence of the Eﬀects of Government Spending in
Chile
In the present section we provide some evidence on the macroeconomic eﬀects of government spend-
ing shocks, using Chilean data for the past two decades. Following much of the literature, we rely
on estimated VARs. While the literature has largely focused on the eﬀects of government purchases
(often restricted to military ones), we also examine the impact of changes in transfers, since the
latter are perceived as an important stabilization tool in Chile and have historically displayed large
changes. In both cases, we report impulse response functions (IRFs), as well as estimates of the
size of the output and consumption multipliers.
2.1 The Eﬀects of Government Purchases
We ﬁrst consider a small VAR speciﬁcation including four variables: government purchases (govern-
ment consumption plus public investment), GDP (excluding copper and other natural resources),
private consumption (of durables and nondurables), and government deﬁcit (excluding copper-
related revenues).5 The ﬁrst three variables are expressed in logs and normalized by the size of
the population. The deﬁcit is normalized by lagged GDP. Data availability restricts the sample to
the period 1990Q1-2010Q1. Our VAR includes four lags of all the variables, a constant term and a
second order polynomial in time.
Following much of the literature, identiﬁcation relies on the assumption that government pur-
chases are predetermined relative to the other variables included in the VAR.6 In other words, we
interpret reduced form innovations to government purchases as exogenous shocks to that variable.
This is equivalent to ordering government purchases ﬁrst in a Cholesky factorization of the VAR.
Figure 1 reports the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government pur-
chases, together with the corresponding 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Note that government
purchases increase by nearly close to two percent on impact. In response to that ﬁscal expansion,
both GDP and consumption rise. Both variables display a pattern that is roughly similar over time,
3The exercise of implementing a zero deﬁcit rule provides a good benchmark; however, results are not reported.
Brieﬂy, a zero-deﬁcit ﬁscal rule instrumented by transfers leaving public expenditure exogenous (as in Forni et al.
(2009)) yields positive ﬁscal multipliers (of consumption and GDP). On the other hand, if the shock is on the
government expenditures we ﬁnd a negative ﬁscal multiplier for consumption but a positive one for GDP.
4An appendix with full derivations is available in the working paper version of the paper or available upon request.
5We exclude copper and other natural resources activities from GDP because they are mainly aﬀected by supply
conditions. This strategy is consistent with the way in which we model GDP in our theoretical model.
6See e.g. Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Fatas & Mihov (2001), Galí et al. (2007), and Perotti (2008).
2Figure 1: Impulse response to government purchases shock (small VAR)
with the peak being attained four quarters after the shock in the case of output and three quarters
in the case of consumption. Not surprisingly, the deﬁcit increases on impact.
Table 1 reports the corresponding multipliers for both GDP and consumption at diﬀerent hori-
zons. The basic multiplier measures
dXt+k
dGt for k = 1,2,4,6,8, where dGt is the change in the level
of government purchases on impact, and dXt+k is the corresponding response in the level of GDP
(when X = Y ) or consumption (when X = C), k periods after the shock.7 The GDP multiplier
is above one half (0.7) on impact, and reaches a peak value close to 1.3 at a four-quarter horizon,
before it goes down. The previous values are similar to those obtained using U.S. data by a variety
of authors (see Hall (2009) for a survey of existing results). A look at the consumption multiplier
points to the importance of that variable in generating the large GDP multiplier, suggesting the
presence of non-Ricardian eﬀects.
In addition to the basic multiplier we also report estimates of the cumulative multiplier at dif-




j=1 dGt+j). The latter takes into account not only the
size of the initial increase in government purchases, but also its subsequent pattern of adjustment.
As shown in Table 1, both the GDP and consumption cumulative multipliers increase in the ﬁrst
year, reﬂecting the persistence of the GDP and consumption responses in that horizon, beyond that
of government purchases.







3Table 1. Eﬀects of government purchases (Small Var)
Basic Cumulative
time/multipliers dC/dG dY/dG dC/dG dY/dG
t=1 0.59 0.67 0.595 0.67
t=2 1.03 0.73 1.47 1.27
t=4 0.94 1.27 3.53 3.46
t=6 0.37 0.22 3.17 3.06
t=8 0.56 0.5 3.01 2.79
Table 2. Eﬀects of government purchases (Large Var)
Basic Cumulative
time/multipliers dC/dG dY/dG dC/dG dY/dG
t=1 0.74 1.10 0.74 1.10
t=2 1.30 1.20 2.05 2.31
t=4 1.19 1.43 4.18 4.45
t=6 0.72 1.00 3.89 4.34
t=8 0.64 0.50 3.72 4.08
We explore the robustness of the previous ﬁndings to the use of a larger VAR, which includes,
in addition to the four variables above, real copper price, total private investment and the real
exchange rate. Given the ﬁscal rule in place, whereby the government is allowed to spend only
the fraction of the increase in copper revenues considered to be permanent, it is natural to order
that price before government purchases, which is now appearing in second place in the VAR.8
Figure 2 displays the estimated IRFs to a government purchases shock using the larger VAR.
The corresponding multipliers are shown in Table 2 The picture that emerges is, qualitatively and
quantitatively, very similar to that obtained using the small VAR. Note that investment also rises in
response to the increase in government purchases, suggesting a role for that variable complementary
to that of consumption in generating the large GDP multiplier. That ampliﬁcation eﬀect is likely
to be partially oﬀset by the real exchange rate appreciation, which should dampen the growth of
aggregate demand. The pattern of the deﬁcit response estimated using the large VAR is also very
similar, suggesting again a deﬁcit increase on impact.
2.2 The Eﬀects of Government Transfers
Next we report estimates of the dynamic eﬀects of government transfers, using an approach anal-
ogous to the one in the previous subsection, with total government transfers substituting for gov-
ernment purchases in the two VARs.
Figure 3 reports the impulse responses to a transfer shock. As shown in the ﬁrst box, the
increase in transfers appears to have a similar persistence than the increase in government purchases
studied above. The resulting responses of output, consumption and the deﬁcit show a pattern not
too diﬀerent from that obtained for government purchases. Also, the sign of the response of the
8The ﬁscal policy rule in place in Chile establishes that government spending is linked to structural revenues (the
permanent component of eﬀective revenues). One component of those structural revenues corresponds to copper
related revenues. Structural copper revenues correspond to the revenues that the government would collect if the
price of copper was equal to their long run price or permanent price.
4Figure 2: Impulse response to government purchases shock (large VAR)
deﬁcit is less clear cut in the case of a shock to transfers. The estimated multipliers shown in Table
3 point to similar orders of magnitude for both GDP and consumption.
The evidence based on the large VAR, reported in Figure 4 and Table 4, provides a similar
picture. One diﬀerence relative to the corresponding ﬁndings for purchases is worth pointing out:
the real exchange depreciates in response to an increase in transfers.
Table 3. Eﬀects of Government Transfers
(Small VAR)
Basic Cumulative
time/multipliers dC/dG dY/dG dC/dG dY/dG
t=1 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.72
t=2 1.17 1.11 1.30 1.47
t=4 0.87 1.61 2.38 2.82
t=6 0.09 0.45 1.96 3.16
t=8 0.41 0.49 2.00 2.98
Table 4. Eﬀects of Government Transfers
(Large VAR)
Basic Cumulative
time/multipliers dC/dG dY/dG dC/dG dY/dG
t=1 0.40 0.88 0.40 0.88
t=2 1.27 1.42 1.34 1.85
t=4 0.68 1.21 2.25 2.76
t=6 0.04 0.72 1.79 3.22
t=8 0.36 0.31 1.78 2.92
5Figure 3: Impulse response to government transfers shock (small VAR)
Figure 4: Impulse response to government transfers shock (large VAR)
62.3 Discussion
The evidence presented on the eﬀects of shocks to government purchases and government transfers
points towards the existence of positive multiplier eﬀects on GDP. The sign and size of the estimated
response of consumption is suggestive of strong non-Ricardian eﬀects, which would account for the
size of both the GDP and consumption multipliers. In the next section we develop an open economy
New Keynesian model that tries to account for these regularities.
3 A Small Open Economy Model for Chile
This section presents the structure of a DSGE model along the lines of Altig et al. (2005), Ad-
jemian et al. (2008) and Adolfson et al. (2007), but extended to incorporate a role for ﬁscal policy.
We build on the work by Galí et al. (2007) and Coenen et al. (2008) who develop versions of a
New Keynesian model allowing for a fraction of non-Ricardian households, but modiﬁed in order
to capture particular features of the Chilean economy. Among the latter we have copper income
explaining a non-negligible share of government’s income, a ﬁscal rule that seeks to keep govern-
ment spending closely linked to structural (permanent) ﬁscal revenues, and an inﬂation targeting
monetary policy regime. A complementary appendix with main model’s derivations is available
upon request from the authors.
3.1 Consumers
There are two types of consumers: Ricardian (with weight 1−λ) and non-Ricardian (with weight λ),
denoted with superscript j = {R,N}. Ricardian consumers are assumed to have access to ﬁnancial
markets to smooth consumption over time, whereas non-Ricardian ones do not. Implicitly, though,
we make an exception to the latter assumption in order to simplify the analysis: we assume full
insurance of the risk generated by Calvo wage setting among consumers of a given type (as in
Coenen et al. (2008)).






with period utility given by
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t(h) is a consumption index and L
j
t(h) denotes hours of work. Note that b measures the
degree of internal habit formation,   ζ is a constant, σL is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity and ζt
is a shock to the disutility from work. The latter parameter is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
with unconditional mean of one, persistence ρζ and constant variance, σ2
ζ.9












































indexes for domestic and imported consumption goods, respectively, with parameter α determining
9Notice that we abuse of notation declaring C
j
t(h) for j = {R,N}; however, we want to stress that the decision
maker is the individual h.
7the degree of openness and η > 1 being the constant elasticity of substitution between domestic
and imported goods.
3.1.1 Ricardian Consumers
Ricardian consumers (h = R) maximize utility subject to two constraints. First, a ﬂow budget
constraint of the form
BR (st,h) + StBR,∗ (st,h) + (1 − τw,t)SWRWR
t (h)LR
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The terms on the left hand side represent consumer h’s cash inﬂows, including maturing one-
period nominal discount bonds (domestic and foreign), labor income (given by after tax and sub-
sidies wage—SWR is a subsidy to eliminate monopolistic distortions—times the number of hours
worked), income from capital leased to ﬁrms net of utilization costs10, transfers (TrR
t (h)) net of
lump-sum taxes (TXR
t (h)), transfers and proﬁts in the form of net of tax distributed dividends,
(1 − τPr,t)PrR
t (h). Note that St is the nominal exchange rate, which measures the number of Chilean
pesos (Ch$) to buy a US dollar (USD). Note also that the utilization rate of physical capital, uR
t (h),












t (h) − 1 + rk 
(uR
t (h) − 1) (4)
where θ > 0 is a parameter that directly inﬂuences the sensitivity of the cost function when uR
t (h)
varies and rk is the real steady state capital rental rate. Note that capital income simpliﬁes to
Rk
t KR
t−1(h) when capital is "fully" utilized (uR
t (h) = 1) because Φ(1) = 0.11
The right hand side of (3) includes the various purchases incurred by the Ricardian consumer:
consumption, investment, and purchases of (state-contingent) domestic and foreign assets. Note




















is the risk premium function, a factor
that adjusts the return at which domestic consumers can borrow or lend to/from the rest of the
world. It depends on the country’s aggregate net foreign asset position B∗
t , on the expected rate
of depreciation Et[St+1/St], as well as an exogenous risk premium shock φt.12 The risk premium
function can be viewed as a measure of international asset market incompleteness (asymmetric
information, entry costs to build the portfolio, etc.). IR




















10In our notation, K
j
t−1(h) reﬂects the agent h’s end of period stock of physical capital ready to be used in the
productive process in period t.
11It follows that Φ′ (.) = θ
￿
uR
t (h) − 1
￿
+ rk, which at the steady state Φ′ (1) = rk and Φ′′ (1) = θ > 0.
12Note that B∗
t is the sum of the net debt position maintained by Ricardian agents, (1 − λ)B
R,∗
t ≡ ￿ 1
λ BR,∗(st,h)dh, and the government. Besides the usual mechanism stressed by Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2001)
(i.e., the one that involves deviations from the targeted net foreign position –in this case we assume that it is zero
for Chile), we follow Adjemian et al. (2008) and Adolfson et al. (2009), by adding a second argument which cap-
tures the deviation of the expected exchange gross depreciation rate from one. Including this additional explanatory
variable induces a negative correlation between the expected depreciation rate and risk premium, which is a relevant
empirical ﬁnding (Duarte & Stockman (2005)).
8where, in a way analogous to consumption, IR
H,t ≡
















represent indexes of domestic and imported investment goods.
A second constraint is given by the law of motion of physical capital:
KR















where δ is the depreciation rate, εI,t is an investment-speciﬁc technology shock, and Ψ ≥ 0 is a
parameter that scales the quadratic installation costs associated with any positive net investment.
The ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) are presented in the Appendix Section A.1.
3.1.2 Non-Ricardian Consumers
Non-Ricardian consumers ( j = N) are assumed to have no access to ﬁnancial markets. Thus, they
consume in the same period their wage income and the transfers they receive from the government.13


















Wage setting follows closely the formalism in Erceg & Levin (2003), with indexation as in Smets &
Wouters (2007). Each consumer is specialized in a diﬀerentiated labor service, which is demanded
by all ﬁrms. The wage elasticity of the demand for each type of labor is constant. Each period, a
given consumer can reset optimally the nominal wage for his labor type with probability φL. Once
the new wage is set, the consumer meets fully the demand for its labor type at the quoted wage.
Between re-optimization periods we allow the nominal wage to be adjusted mechanically according
to the following indexation rule
W
j
t (h) = (Πt−1)




which makes the rate of change of the individual wage a weighted geometric average of lagged price
inﬂation Πt−1 and steady state price inﬂation   Π, with ξL representing the weight of the former.
Presumably, non-Ricardian agents will react more to wages in comparison with Ricardian agents.
Thus, contrary to Medina & Soto (2007), we allow for each agent type to supply diﬀerent number
of hours.14
3.2 Firms
There are two types of ﬁrms operating in the economy: intermediate goods producers and importers.
In addition there are foreign ﬁrms, but we do not model their behavior explicitly.
13As in Galí et al. (2007), we rule out the possibility that non-Ricardian households can smooth consumption
through money holdings in contrast with Coenen et al. (2008)).
14See appendix for details.
93.2.1 Domestic Producers
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each of which produces a diﬀerenti-






Lt(i)1−γ − FCH, (8)
where FCH is a non-negative ﬁxed cost, measured in terms of output. The labor input bundle Lt(i)

















































Firms minimize costs subject to (8) and conditional on any given output level. The resulting










γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ . (10)
Each period, each domestic ﬁrm decides how much labor of each type to hire (given the wage
W
j
t (h)) and how much capital services to rent (given the rental rate RK
t ). In addition, and with
probability φH, any given ﬁrm can readjust optimally the price of its good, setting a price ˜ PH,t(i). In
the absence of reoptimization, the ﬁrm’s price is adjusted mechanically according to the indexation
rule
PH,t(i) = (Πt−1)
ξH    Π
 (1−ξH) PH,t−1(i)
Given its price at any point in time, the ﬁrm produces a quantity in order to meet fully the
demand for its good.
3.2.2 Importers
There is a continuum of ﬁrms which import a good produced overseas at a price StP∗
F,t, "repackage"
it and sell it as a diﬀerentiated good in the domestic market. Each importer reoptimizes the price of
its good with a probability φF, setting a price ˜ PF,t(i), subject to a sequence of demand constraints.
In the absence of reoptimization, the price is adjusted according to the indexation rule:
PF,t(i) = (Πt−1)
ξF    Π
 (1−ξF ) PF,t−1(i)
Like domestic producers, importers meet the demand for their good at the prevailing price.
103.3 Fiscal Policy
The government purchases goods from both domestic ﬁrms and importers. Those purchases are
assumed not to have any eﬀect on private utility or productivity. The government allocates its




0 PF,t(i)GF,t(i)di, among the diﬀerent































. The solution to that
problem yields a set of demand functions for each good, which will have to be added to the demand









In addition to purchasing goods, the government taxes consumption, labor income, and proﬁts,
it transfers resources to consumers, and issues debt in domestic and foreign goods markets. That
activity is summarized in the government budget constraint, which takes the following form:
PtTrt + gtPtYt + Bt + StB∗
t + (SF − 1)PF,t
  1
0














































TXt(h)dh + Pcu,tκXcu,tYt + τcu,tPcu,t (1 − κ)Xcu,tYt + Pmo,tXmo,tYt (13)









t (h)dh, government consumption PG,tGt ≡ gtPtYt
(where gt ≡
PG,tGt
PtYt is the share of government consumption in GDP), repayment of maturing gov-
ernment bonds (both domestic, Bt, and foreign, StB∗
t ), and subsidies on foreign goods expenditures







tRPt ), labor income taxes, taxes on proﬁts, lump-sum taxes, and copper-related revenues.
The latter are explained brieﬂy next.
Copper production is assumed to be stochastic and exogenous. Consistent with the market
structure of copper production in Chile, the state-own company accounts for a share κ of produc-
tion (all of which accrues to the government as revenue). The remaining share corresponds to foreign
companies which are taxed at a rate τcu,t. We assume that the world copper prices, P∗
cu,t, are ex-
ogenously given, implying a domestic copper price Pcu,t = StP∗
cu,t. The share of copper production
to GDP, Xcu,t, follows an exogenous process, described below. In addition, Xmo,t represents the
output of molybdenum (a byproduct of copper production) as a share of GDP. The molybdenum
11world price is exogenous and given by P∗
mo,t. All revenues from molybdenum production accrue to
the government.
Following Forni et al. (2009), tax rates on wages, beneﬁts and on copper production are allowed















τcu + ρτcuτcu,t−1 + ετcu,t, (16)
where τw, τPr and τcu are long run tax rates, ρτw, ρτPr, and ρτcu explain the degree of persistency,
ετw,t, ετPr,t and ετcu,t are iid shocks with zero means and constant variances.
Fiscal policy in Chile is conducted within the framework of a structural balance rule. Speciﬁcally,
the rule is called the Chilean structural balance ﬁscal rule.15 As discussed in the introduction, the
Chilean ﬁscal rule ties government spending to structural/permanent government revenues. Such
a rule has been followed explicitly by the Chilean government since 2001 and implicitly since the
beginnings of the nineties.16 We formalize that rule by assuming that total government spending
(including interest payments) plus a time varying "surplus target" (surplus) must be equal to
structural revenues. Structural revenues correspond to the revenues that the government would





mo,t respectively) and (ii) the economy were producing at its steady state
level (potential output). The "surplus target"—the diﬀerence between government spending and
structural revenues— is set by the ﬁscal authorities. When the ﬁscal rule was introduced in 2001 the
structural surplus target was set at 1% of GDP. The idea was to acknowledge that public debt was at
a level higher than what was considered appropriate for a small open economy that faced exogenous
credit constraint shocks and given potential future pension liabilities. It is worth noting that even
though ﬁscal policy was not conducted using an explicit rule in the nineties, the "shadow" structural
surplus averaged 1% of GDP in that decade. Again, the goal behind the structural balance rule
was to reduce government debt to some "long run" (sustainable) level. Motivated by the observed
practice, we assume that the structural surplus, surplust, is a function of the diﬀerence between






where F′ > 0. If government debt is higher than its long run target, the structural surplus is positive
which reduces government spending given structural revenues. Additionally, we assume that the
surplus target depends on an exogenous shock st that follows and autoregressive process of order
one. In particular, we assume that:
st = ρsst−1 + εs,t, (18)
where εs,t follows an i.i.d. process with mean zero and constant variance σ2
εs,s.
In practice, we assume that B = 0 (Chile exhibited by the end of the last decade a net creditor
position of around 3% of GDP). This formulation allow us to have a well speciﬁed ﬁscal rule
15Previous papers that have analyzed the eﬀects of the Chilean ﬁscal rule in DSGE models are Garcia & Restrepo
(2007), Medina & Soto (2007) and Kumhof & Laxton (2009)
16By "implicitly" we mean that even though there was no explicitly commitment to any ﬁscal policy rule in that
period, ﬁscal policy outcomes in the nineties resemble the ones that could have been obtained by the implementation
of the Chilean ﬁscal rule of the 2000.
12(government debt is stationary) while capturing the most relevant aspects of the Chilean ﬁscal rule.
A negative surplus shock (reduction in s) makes room for a rise in total government spending,
which can be allocated to transfers or consumption. One can show that under this formulation the
dynamics of debt are described by:























































Clearly, if the current price of copper is above its long term value, we have a ﬁscal surplus (a
reduction in government debt). The same is true for the other determinants of government revenues.
From this particular speciﬁcation of the Chilean ﬁscal rule we can derive a more traditional
ﬁscal policy representation for the Bayesian estimation of the structural model, along the lines of
our empirical strategy. We assume a speciﬁcation for government consumption and transfers con-
sistent with the representation of the Chilean ﬁscal rule just described. In particular, we represent
government consumption by the next process
gt = (1 − ρG)g + ρGgt−1 + εG,t, (19)
where ρG measures the persistence of the process, g is the long run government share, PGG
PY , and
εG,t is an exogenous a shock with mean zero and constant variance σ2
εG. Under this speciﬁcation,
shocks to government consumption imply an increase in government debt in the current period and
an adjustment in the structural surplus target (surplus) from next period. Given our speciﬁcation,
the adjustment in the surplus target translates into an adjustment in government transfers. Con-
sistently, shocks to the surplus target (s) are translated into one-to-one movements in transfers. In
particular, a negative shock to the surplus target, increases government transfers. The evolution
of transfers mimics the evolution of the surplus target (surplus) determined by equations (17) and
(18).
3.4 Monetary Policy
We assume that the Central Bank (CB) sets the (gross) nominal interest rate, Rrule,t according to















where ψR determines the degree of smoothing, and εm,t is an exogenous i.i.d. monetary policy
shock. The target values are steady state GDP without the copper sector,   Yr, and inﬂation,   ΠA,
13assumed to be 1 for simplicity.17 According with the Taylor principle, the reaction parameter
to annualized inﬂation deviations ψπ should be larger than one, where ΠA,t ≡ Π4
t, while ψy for
quarterly data should be around 0.5/4.
We have also studied an extension of the rule above that allows for a systematic interest rate
response to nominal exchange rate variations. That extension could be useful to accommodate the
policy regime from 1986:1 to 2001:2, as documented by Medina & Soto (2007). In the analysis that
follows we ignore this term since in this paper we focus on the sample period 2001:3-2010:1.
4 Equilibrium and Aggregation
We ﬁrst state clearing conditions in the markets for domestic inputs. Thus, for labor services of





where Lt(h,i) is ﬁrm i’s demand for labor services from household h. A similar condition must
hold for all h ∈ [0,1].
Given that only Ricardian households engage in capital accumulation, the market clearing con-
dition in the market for that input is given by
Kt = (1 − λ)KR
t




t (h)dh . Similarly, for other asset holdings we have
Bt = (1 − λ)BR
t
B∗







t is the amount of liabilities so with the negative sign converts to net holdings). In
the same manner, aggregate real variables such as consumption and investment are:
Ct = λCN
t + (1 − λ)CR
t ,









Market clearing in the home produced goods implies that supply given by the aggregated version





H,t (1 − α)(Ct + It) + T
−η











After some little algebra we can derive the following expression for aggregate output, Yt, and
17This is without loss of generality, since during the 2000s the inﬂation rate in Chile ﬂuctuated quite closely around
the three percent inﬂation target. In the empirical implementation we subtract this target.












































Notice that the central bank targets Yr,t instead of Yt. From equation (23) we can isolate the






















































































where we take into account that Ct + It, come from Eq. (25).



















where ρ is a diagonal matrix containing the corresponding autoregressive coeﬃcients, and {εt} is the
vector of exogenous serially uncorrelated shocks with zero mean and diagonal variance-covariance
matrix Σε.
5 Calibration and Estimation
We estimate the model above using Bayesian methods. First, we deﬁne the measurement equation
which links the observed variables with the model’s solution or law of motion.20 Then, the Kalman
18For details see the derivation in Section A.2, see appendix (available upon request).
19For further details on the derivation refer to the appendix Section A.3.
20Calculations are performed with the set of routines included in DYNARE, Juillard (2005)
15ﬁlter is employed to evaluate the posterior density (which is proportional to the product of the
likelihood and the assumed prior densities).21
To be consistent with the assumptions involving technology in the model, we get rid of the
trend of non-stationary variables by ﬁltering the data with a (deterministic) quadratic trend (in
accordance with our VAR estimation). Moreover, we lower the observed inﬂation rate by the
inﬂation target, i.e. three percent annually. Similarly, for the interest rate we subtract a neutral
interest rate of 5 percent (the inﬂation target plus an assumed steady state real rate of 2 percent).
We restrict estimation to the sample period 2001Q3-2010Q1, a period characterized by a well
deﬁned monetary policy based on an inﬂation target and a ﬂexible exchange rate.
We calibrate a subset of parameters. These are, β = 0.9878 which is consistent with a neutral
annual interest rate of 5 %. Import shares α = αG = 0.3 approximate the import/GDP ratio. The
settings α∗
C = α∗
I = 0.0004 are consistent with the share of Chilean GDP to world GDP (0.35%).
The elasticities of substitution among varieties of intermediate and ﬁnal imported goods are εH =
εF = 11, consistent with markups µH = µF = SF = 1.1. Further, the elasticities of substitution
among varieties of labor types are εLR = εLN = 9 which imply markups µWR = SWR = µWN =
SWN = 1.125. In addition,   ζ = 7.5 as in Adolfson et al. (2007), the annual depreciation rate is
assumed to be 10% (δ = 0.025), and some steady state ratios and relative prices are Xshare
cu = 0.044,
Xshare
mo = 0.01, g = 0.094, AH = 1, τw = 0.2, τPr = 0.17 and T = TH = TGH = 1. We also left
calibrated the Calvo price and wage probabilities because of lack of identiﬁcation under usual
priors. Furthermore, the habit formation parameter aﬀects the steady state due to the assumption
of internal habit formation; therefore we calibrate it to 0.8. For exogenous processes of copper and
molybdenum shares which are not identiﬁed, ρxcu and ρxmo, we assume an autoregressive coeﬃcient
of 0.1.22 Last but not least, the elasticity η is calibrated to 2.
The crucial parameter λ is left calibrated to 0.50 due to lack of identiﬁcation. Data from the
Household Financial Survey (EFH) implemented by the Central Bank of Chile in 2007 suggest a λ
value of 0.29. This value is computed by adding the fraction of households that requested a ﬁnancial
credit and were rejected one or more times, the fraction that did not apply to any ﬁnancial credit
because they expected to be rejected and the fraction that considered themselves unable to aﬀord
the credit payments. All things considered, we calibrate λ to a conservative 0.5 since the data
from the EFH corresponds to a period in which credit expanded rapidly towards ﬁrst time credit
holders.23
The prior densities are quite standard. We choose a gamma density for the friction parameter
of investment Ψ with prior mean 50 and SD equal to 20. The prior mean for the elasticity of the RP
respect to the asset position is 0.04 with prior SD of one tenth of the mean with Beta distribution.
Similar density type is chosen for persistence parameters )such as ψRandtheρ’s) with mean 0.5 and
variance 0.2. The priors for Taylor rule parameters are quite standard, see Smets & Wouters (2003).
For variances of standard errors and measurement errors we assume inverted gamma distributions
with 20 and 1 degrees of freedom, depending on whether the errors refer variables or on shares
(which vary less), respectively.
The set of observed variables includes 11 time series which are gathered in the vector oZt=(oYr,t,
21For details on these aspects see Fornero (2010).
22We tried also a VAR(1) for foreign variables as it is usually done in the literature; however, oﬀ diagonal elements
of the persistency matrix turned out to be not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Thus, we specify AR(1) processes for
R∗, Π∗ and Y ∗.
23Deﬁning credit-constrained households as those who cannot access to low-cost credit and hence end up using
high-cost credit (credit cards), Ruiz-Tagle (2009) ﬁnds that at least 41% of Chilean households were credit constrained
in 2004.
16oY ∗
t , oCt, oIt, oΠt, oΠ∗
t, oRt, oR∗
t, owt, oRERt, ogt)’. Since the current model version does not
have a balance growth path, the data has been ﬁltered up employing a linear quadratic trend
or if the resulting detrended time series is not stationary we applied the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter,
then we scale variables with the SS values. In addition, we allow for measurement errors which
are included in the vector meZt =(meYr,t, meY ∗
t , meCt, meIt, meΠt, meΠ∗
t, meRt, meR∗
t, mewt,
meRERt, megt)’. In the case of interest rates and inﬂation, which are not ﬁltered, we subtract the
neutral interest rates and inﬂation targets (foreign inﬂation in demeaned). Measurement errors are
assumed to be i.i.d.
17Table 5. Estimation results Chilean ﬁscal rule
Parameters Prior density Prior mean Prior SD Post. mean 0.05 0.95
Ψ Γ 50 20 64.3307 37.3497 91.4607
φa β 0.04 0.004 0.0393 0.0326 0.0465
θ N 1 0.25 0.9359 0.5269 1.4169
ψR β 0.5 0.15 0.8441 0.6771 0.9445
ψπ N 1.5 0.15 1.249 0.9751 1.5452
ψyr β 0.125 0.05 0.1729 0.067 0.2745
ρζ β 0.5 0.2 0.7033 0.338 0.9501
ρRERF β 0.5 0.2 0.9338 0.8781 0.974
ρφa β 0.5 0.2 0.5098 0.1845 0.8135
ρπ∗ β 0.5 0.2 0.4853 0.3284 0.636
ρy∗ β 0.5 0.2 0.4913 0.1717 0.8071
ρAH β 0.5 0.2 0.7555 0.4927 0.9325
ρG β 0.5 0.2 0.7138 0.5341 0.8921
ρR∗ β 0.5 0.2 0.4861 0.2121 0.7808
ρεI β 0.5 0.2 0.5875 0.2482 0.8941
ρvtr β 0.5 0.2 0.5565 0.2293 0.8551
SD of shocks Prior density Prior mean g.l. Post. mean 0.05 0.95
vm Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0038 0.002 0.0052
εζ Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0424 0.0029 0.0689
εRERF Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0032 0.002 0.0043
επ∗ Γ−1 0.037 20 0.014 0.0111 0.0169
εAH Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0054 0.0036 0.0074
εφa Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0044 0.0023 0.0064
εI Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0122 0.0027 0.026
εG Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0038 0.0026 0.0052
εtr Γ−1 0.01 20 0.0061 0.0025 0.0098
εs Γ−1 0.01 1 0.0085 0.0026 0.015
SD meas. errors Prior density Prior mean g.l. Post. mean 0.05 0.95
meY R Γ−1 0.001 1 0.001 0.0003 0.0016
meC Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0007 0.0003 0.0011
meI Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0711 0.0558 0.0847
meπ Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0037 0.0002 0.0193
meR Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009
meW Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0256 0.0182 0.033
meRER Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0468 0.0352 0.0592
meY ∗ Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0007 0.0003 0.0012
meπ∗ Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0006 0.0002 0.0011
meR∗ Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0007 0.0003 0.0012
meg Γ−1 0.001 1 0.0021 0.0009 0.0037
186 Simulations
In this section we present impulse response functions (IRF) to various shocks under the structural
balance ﬁscal rule introduced above. Then, we calculate the estimated model’s ﬁscal multipliers.
6.1 Impulse response functions
This section reports the IRFs. The analysis focuses on the implied size of the consumption and
output ﬁscal multipliers. In Figure 5 we present the dynamic response of the economy for a govern-
ment spending (consumption) shock, εG, equal to 1% of GDP. Note that the impact on output and
consumption is positive. Government expenditure increases following (19). Since transfers only
respond gradually to oﬀset the increase in spending, through changes in the surplus target, the
shock is more expansionary and stimulates consumption and output. This is a critical diﬀerence
to the case in which the government follows a structural balance rule. Under this formulation, the
transfers will have to adjust to fully oﬀset the increase in government consumption. This impulse
response is consistent with the VAR evidence reported in a previous section.
Figure 6 displays the IRFs to a positive shock to the total factor productivity. As a result of
that shock marginal costs decrease, nominal wages tend to increase but since they are sticky cannot
react immediately; however, real wages go up due to deﬂationary pressures caused by the shock.
Also there would be an appreciation of the real exchange rate that would mitigate the expansion
of exports. Consumption of Ricardian agents reacts positively, whereas for non-Ricardian agents
consumption remains negative during 2 quarters. The higher consumption of Ricardian agents
under the Chilean ﬁscal rule can be associated to the fact that under this speciﬁcation of ﬁscal
policy, agents understand that the government is going to save, so they consume more.
Figure 5: A positive shock to gt of size 1%.
































































































































































19Figure 6: A positive productivity shock of 1%

































































































































































Figure 7 illustrates a shock in the copper-to-GDP share of 1 percentage point. The multiplier of
GDP is positive. Consumption of Ricardian agents increases. A fraction of this increase is explained
by the fact that under the Chilean ﬁscal rule the government is saving the temporary increase in
revenues, which is compatible with larger consumption levels for Ricardian agents. The response
of non-Ricardian agents’ consumption is interesting to analyze. Under a balanced budget rule, all
the temporary increase in revenues would be transferred to the public, leading to a large increase
in consumption of non-Ricardian households in the short run (as opposed to Ricardian agents, who
smooth consumption and hence save much of the transfer). By contrast, the Chilean rule would ﬁx
the expenditure to a constant, thereby government savings would increase.
Figure 7: A positive shock to the copper-to-GDP share of 1%




























































































































































Figure 8 considers a shock to transfers of 1 percent. Note that the estimated persistence of the
AR(1) process for the transfers process is 0.56. Ricardian consumers save the temporary increase
in transfers, whereas non-Ricardian agents consume all. The positive response of consumption by
non-Ricardian agents leads to an aggregate consumption multiplier that is positive for about one
year. GDP increases as well, the response path suggests a larger multiplier than consumption.
20Figure 8: A positive transfers shock of 1%.
































































































































































Figure 9 reports a positive shock of 1 percent in the price of copper relative to the foreign price
index. The results are qualitatively similar to those observed in Figure 5. The GDP multiplier is
positive as well as Ricardian consumption. Non-Ricardian consumption decreases under the Chilean
rule. The reason being that the government saves for a while by buying public debt.24
Figure 9: A positive shock to the copper price of 1%.


























































































































































In Figure 10 we report responses to an expansive monetary policy under estimated parameters.
The drop of interest rates cause a hump-shaped consumption pattern for Ricardian agents, while
for non-Ricardians responses are monotonic. Overall aggregate consumption and GDP expand as
it would be expected in any New Keynesian model like ours. Non-Ricardian consumption expands
due to increases in wages and tax revenues (that are distributed through transfers, which turn
out to be mitigated by the Chilean ﬁscal rule). Of course, the drop in interest rates makes it less
24The GDP multiplier remains also positive in the case of a zero-deﬁcit rule, results not shown. Non-Ricardian
consumption increases under a zero deﬁcit rule because the government distributes higher transfers.
21attractive to invest in domestic ﬁxed income assets in comparison with foreign assets, leading to a
depreciation of the domestic currency.
Figure 10: An expansive monetary policy: shock to interest rate instrument of 1%



























































































































































6.2 Model’s ﬁscal multipliers
Consistent with the impulse response functions just shown, this section calculates ﬁscal multipliers
for an expansionary ﬁscal policy with the estimated model. Table 6 illustrates both dynamic as
well as dynamic cumulated multipliers, therefore these ﬁgures are comparable with those reported
in Tables 1 and 2.
We saw in Section 2 that ﬁscal multipliers were over 1 when implementing a variety of structural
VARs. Overall, we conﬁrm these ﬁndings with our estimated model; the results resemble those of
the open economy or "large" VAR. In particular, we observe in Table 6 important non-Ricardian
eﬀects in aggregate output and consumption of an expansionary ﬁscal policy (hours worked also
increase).
What do the consumption multipliers look like for each of the two agent types? To address this,
we further calculate dCR/dG and dCN/dG (and their cumulant versions). Aggregate consumption
increases for a while because consumption of constrained agents goes up and compensates the
drop in consumption by agents that are Ricardian. Cumulated multipliers suggest that aggregate
consumption is 0.24 of the initial ﬁscal impulse by the end of the year. At the same horizon, this
is explained because there is a positive eﬀect in consumption of non-Ricardian agents (2.39) that
outweighs the negative eﬀect of the Ricardian ones (-1.92).
Table 6. Model’s ﬁscal multipliers (increase in public spending)
Multipliers Cumulated Multipliers
time/multipliers dY/dG dC/dG dCR/dG dCN/dG dY/dG dC/dG dCR/dG dCN/dG
t=1 1.74 0.49 -0.27 1.25 1.74 0.49 -0.27 1.25
t=2 1.01 0.11 -0.45 0.67 2.75 0.60 -0.72 1.92
t=4 0.25 -0.25 -0.63 0.14 3.54 0.24 -1.92 2.39
t=6 -0.03 -0.32 -0.63 -0.02 3.58 -0.39 -3.19 2.41
t=8 -0.12 -0.30 -0.55 -0.06 3.37 -1.02 -4.33 2.30
227 Conclusions
This paper presents VAR evidence on ﬁscal multipliers that are large and robust for Chile. The
evidence we present indicates that aggregate real consumption and real GDP expand signiﬁcantly
when transfers and /or government expenditure go up. Results from small VARs (four variables)
suggest that basic multipliers of consumption peak at the second quarter with values larger than
one, while the peak is slightly delayed and larger in magnitude when considering output multipliers.
Accumulated multipliers grow steadily and peak between 4 and 6 quarters and then the expansionary
eﬀect come to halt and start to fall at a lower level. Values range from 2.4 to 3.5 for consumption
and 3.2 to 3.5 for output. Large VARs take explicitly into account the fact that Chile is a small open
economy in the speciﬁcation by including three additional variables (copper price as exogenous, total
private investment and the RER) produce consumption and output responses that are stronger in
the face of a shock to government purchases. The large VAR with transfers shocks exhibits ﬁscal
multipliers similar to the ones obtained from the small VAR.
We confront this evidence with the prediction of a DSGE model for the Chilean economy.
The model features two household types: Ricardian and non-Ricardian. The former solve a typi-
cal dynamic programming problem, whereas non-Ricardian households consume labor income and
transfers within the period. We assume a standard speciﬁcation for monetary policy but allow for
a ﬁscal policy that approximates the Chilean ﬁscal policy rule characterized by expenditure ﬂows
responding to structural or long run revenues.
The results indicate that when a balanced budget rule is instrumented by transfers (leaving pub-
lic expenditure exogenous) a public transfer shock yields positive ﬁscal multipliers of consumption
and output. On the other hand, if government purchases are shocked instead, the balanced budget
rule causes a negative ﬁscal multiplier for consumption but a positive one for GDP. Interestingly,
the implementation of a ﬁscal policy rule that approximates the Chilean ﬁscal rule in the model
leads to the ﬁnding that both the consumption and output ﬁscal multipliers are positive in the
short run.
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25Appendix to "Non-Ricardian Aspects of Fiscal Policy in
Chile" by Céspedes, Fornero and Gali (2011)
A Derivation of particular equations of the model
A.1 First order conditions: the Ricardian consumer
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,
where ˜ Λt and Ξt ≡ ˜ ΛtPtqt (qt is the Tobin’s q) are Lagrange multipliers relative to the CBC and law







st+a+1|st+a Q∗  
st+a+1,st+a 
are relevant
















RPt+a ( , , )
, (29)
where RPt+a ( , , ) is deﬁned in footnote 12.
The Ricardian consumer chooses consumption allocations, home and foreign asset holdings,
investment, capital, the utilization rate and labor hours (derived in a separated section). The
resulting FOCs can be summarized in the following.
















t ≡ ˜ ΛR
t Pt is the (real) Lagrange multiplier that equalizes the marginal utility w.r.t. con-
sumption.
25This notation is more explicit than in Woodford (2003) Ch. 3: st+h stands for the history of states of the world
that have taken place until t + h, thus Q
￿
st+h+1,st+h￿
indicates the value of the discount factor in a particular
state at t + h + 1 (among all possible states).



























respectively, where Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1 stands for gross aggregate inﬂation.
















tRPt ( , , )
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A.2 Derivation of the GDP identity
In this subsection we derive the gross domestic product (GDP) identity Eq. (23) in the main text.
Begin with GDP deﬁnition: the sum of consumption, investment, government spending and net
exports (minus resources lost due to adjustment of capital utilization):
































































































































and reorganizing we get Eq. (23).
A.3 Derivation of the net foreign asset (NFA) position
This section derives the NFA under incomplete international asset markets.
First, notice that domestic nominal aggregated beneﬁts that accrue to Ricardian households
are:



















(CF,t + IF,t + GF,t)
 
, (36)









beneﬁts of domestic intermediate producers and ﬁnal goods importers, respectively. Notice that Eq.
(36) assumes complete home bias in stocks property holdings. Once the subsidy to the importer, SF,
is considered the price turns out to be
µF
SF PF,t = PF,t (recall that PF,t ≡ µFStP∗
F,t) and the LOOP
is restored if and only if SF = µF.26 In other words, thanks to the subsidy the consumer eﬀectively









Pt = RERF,tTH,tTt. Aggregate proﬁts from private
copper ﬁrms are:
Prcu,t = PtRERtp∗
cu,t (1 − τcu,t)(1 − κ)Xshare
cu,t Yt. (37)
Second, for convenience rewrite the CBCs for Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, Eqs. (3)
and (7), respectively:27
BR (st,h) + StB
R,∗













































t (h) + Pt
 
TrN




t (h) = 0.
26Notice that
TH
MCH = µH at the steady state.
27Recall that due to the demand aggregation (i.e., integration across goods) CR















t (h) = ∆H,tTH,tCN
H,t(h)
+∆F,tTH,tTtCN
F,t(h), for any household h.
28Integrating ﬁrst over goods and then over agents, we obtain:
(1 − λ)BR
t + (1 − λ)StB
R,∗
t + (1 − τw,t)SWRDR
W,tWR
t LR
t + Pt (1 − λ)TrR
t


























  + (1 − τPr,t)Prt
+Rk
t uR



































where we replaced CR
t and IR
t by their equivalents taking into account demands’ structure. To
simplify the algebra we assume that ∆H,t = ∆F,t and combine both restrictions to obtain:
(1 − λ)BR
t + (1 − λ)StB
R,∗


















tRPt( , , ) + (1 − τPr,t)Prt
+Rk
tuR





Kt−1 − ∆H,tPtCt − ∆H,tPt (1 − λ)IR
t = 0.
(38)
Third, taking into account the GBC (13) and assuming that period-to-period outﬂows are equal
to sources of income, we can calculate lump-sum transfers consistent with a zero-deﬁcit rule:



















cu,t [κ + τcu,t (1 − κ)]Xshare






















Combine transfers from the previous equation with Eq. (38) and cancel out common terms:28
(1 − λ)BR
t + (1 − λ)StB
R,∗































cu,t [κ + τcu,t (1 − κ)]Xshare

































tRPt( , , ) + (1 − τPr,t)Prt
+Rk
t uR


















CF,t + IF,t + GF,t
￿
= 0, since µF − 1 −

















tRPt( , , ) + StP∗
t p∗
cu,t [κ + τcu,t (1 − κ)]Xshare
















Kt−1 − ∆H,tPt (Ct + It) = 0.



















cu,t [κ + τcu,t (1 − κ)]Xshare














Kt−1 − ∆H,tPt (Ct + It) = 0,
recall that B∗




t where it is understood that B
R,∗
t are net holdings of private
agents, while −B
G,∗

























































H,t (Ct + It)






















−TH,tFCH − ∆H,t (Ct + It)






























+ NXt − RERtp∗









where we employed the following deﬁnition for net exports (strickly speaking, we should add Eq.
















(1 − α)(Ct + It)





















t − THFCH − ∆H,t (Ct + It)







30where Eq. (37) provides the clue to gauge the net rents balance of the balance of payments, i.e.
beneﬁts of foreign mining companies:
NRt ≡ −RERtp∗
cu,t (1 − τcu,t)(1 − κ)Xshare
cu,t Yt. (42)
Thus, it is required in equilibrium that NX + NR = 0 to avoid debt accumulation. In the case of
Chile, it is the case that long run data supports a ratio NX-to-GDP of 2% while the rents balance
is a deﬁcit of the approximately the same magnitude. Besides, recall that terms signaled with     ,
in (39) come from Equation (25).























tRPt ( , , )
Yt+1
























































∆H,t (Ct + It)
Yt










cu,t (1 − τcu,t)(1 − κ)Xshare
cu,t . (45)
Either we can employ (26) and (27) or (43) and (44).
A.4 Derivation of TGH

























































1 − α + αT
1−η
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1 − α + αT
1−η
t






31B Steady State (complete asset markets)




Π = ΠH = ΠF = Π∗ = 1.
For home producers it follows from optimality conditions that at the SS TH ≡ PH
P = µHMCH,





























where we employed the deﬁnition RERF ≡
SP∗
F



















































Next, we seek to pin down SS inputs’ prices. First, consider the FOC w.r.t. capital (34) at the





























, to express the previous equation in



















































and ﬁnally at the SS materialized investment level is identical to the desired level, just to replace
the capital that is depreciated, IR
KR = δ (this result comes from the law of motion of capital (6) at
the SS, IR = δKR). Thus,
1 = β
 






− (1 − δ). (50)






γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ





γγ(1−γ)1−γ , leads to:
w =













where rk comes from (50).
From the production function optimality condition (marginal rate of transformation is equal to














Total nominal domestic proﬁts are Pr=PrH+PrF. Home traders’ nominal proﬁts are PrH =
PBH = PHYH
MCH −WL−RkK−PHFCH and real proﬁts (here real means in terms of the consumption




− wL − rkK − THFCH. (53)
Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the no entry condition guarantees that
real beneﬁts are zero at the steady state (BH,t = 0). Thus, the Euler theorem states that the




THYH = wL + rkK. (54)
33We rewrite Eq. (53) taking into account Eq. (47) and Eq. (54) we may ﬁnd out the value of
FCH such that BH,t = 0 holds:




































Lis given by Eq. (52). Thus, to check that beneﬁts BH are zero just substitute FCH into
Eq. (55):















































L = 0. (57)




(CF + IF + GF) − RERFTHT       
=MCF
(CF + IF + GF),




















PF       
=RERF
PF
P     
=THT







RERFTHT (CF + IF + GF) = 0. (58)
The marginal utility of consumption from equation (30) at the SS, both for {R,N} are:
Λj =
(1 − βb)
Cj (1 − b)
. (59)









































The market clearance condition for home produced goods, Eq. (22), at the SS can be written
as (recall that ∆H = ∆F = uR = 1):
AHKγL1−γ − FCH = (1 − α)T
−η
H (C + I) + (1 − αG)T
−η
GHG










      
exports
. (60)
We assume that at the SS the nominal trade balance is zero, i.e., the value of total exports












Y = PF (CF + IF + GF), (nominal)




















      




−η (C + I) + αG (TGHT)
−η G
 




The intermediate export level that is consistent with the zero trade balance (expressed in terms








Y ∗ = T
 
α(THT)



















We seek to introduce the information of the zero trade balance into the SS solution, so we
replace Eq. (62) into the equilibrium condition of home (intermediate) produced goods, i.e. into
(60): YH = CH + IH + GH + C∗
H + I∗
H (in real terms w.r.t. PH). Further, we substitute the ﬁxed














L = (1 − α)T
−η


































1 − α + αT 1−η 
T
−η
H (C + I)
+
 




















µH and in the RHS PG
P G = PGG
PY Y = gY ⇒
G = P
















1 − α + αT 1−η 
T
−η









(1 − α) + αT1−η














Y     
and recall that the term      is the real GDP:











Y − THT (CF + IF + GF) + 0K,
= C + I +
 
(1 − αG) + αGT1−η






























(1 − α) + αT1−η




























(C + I) +
  











= ̥1 (C + I), (63)
























































C + I    
=δK
(65)


















































First, begin with non-Ricardian consumers’ SS, whose consumption is deduced from the aggre-
gated version of Eq. (7):




























λCN = (1 − τw)SWNwNLN + λTrN,net,
where we deﬁne TrN,net ≡ TrN −TXN as the amount of net of lump-sum taxes transfers received
from the government. We assume that TrN,net = TrR,net = Trnet and it comes from the real














SWRwRLR + SWNwNLN 











cu (1 − κ)Xshare
cu Y (67)
−(SWR − 1)wRLR − (SWN − 1)wNLN − gY,
where R = Π
β , b = (1 − λ) BR
P , bG,∗ = BG,∗
P and PrR = 0 due to results from Eqs. (53) and (58)
(the latter result is due to the fact that we purposely set FCH so that Eq. (57) holds, while for
BF = 0 to be true, subsidies given to importers should not be taken into account again, i.e. positive
beneﬁts from importers vanish with subsidies −(SF − 1) PF
P (CF + IF + GF) which explains why
we omit them). Thus, CN can be written as:






















cu (1 − κ)Xshare
cu Y
−(SWR − 1)wRLR − (SWN − 1)wNLN − gY

,






















37Grouping LN and LR yield:





















cu (1 − κ)Xshare
cu Y
+λ[τwSWR − (SWR − 1)]wRLR − λgY,












cu (1 − κ)Xshare
















substitute Y by its equal from Eq. (63):

























̥1 (C + I).
Further, substitute I by δ K
L L, where L comes from the labor aggregator Eq. (9):































































where ̥1 is deﬁned in Eq. (64) and reorganize:
λCN = [(1 − τw)SWN − λ(SWN − 1) + λτwSWN]wNLN








deﬁne the constants ̥4 ≡ λ, ̥5 ≡ (1 − τw)SWN−λ(SWN − 1)+λτwSWN, ̥6 ≡ λ[τwSWR − (SWR − 1)]
and ̥7 ≡ ̥3 and rewrite:








Plugging CN from (68) into the aggregation condition, (recall that ̥4 ≡ λ) C = λCN +
(1 − λ)CR, yields:
C = ̥5wNLN + ̥6wRLR + ̥7C + ̥7δ
K
L















38Next, continue with Ricardian consumers’ SS. Begin with the aggregated real version of the
CBC (3) evaluated at the SS:30
(1 − λ)CR = (1 − λ)bR + RER(1 − λ)bR,∗ + (1 − τw)SWRwRLR
+(1 − λ)TrR,net − Π
R (1 − λ)bR
− Π
R∗RER(1 − λ)bR,∗ + (1 − τPr)(1 − λ)Pr
R + rk (1 − λ)KR − (1 − λ)IR
recall that in equilibrium bR,∗ = (1 − λ) BR,∗
P , K = (1 − λ)KR, I = (1 − λ)IR, Pr= (1 − λ)PrR =
(1 − λ)0 = 0:










RERbR,∗ + (1 − τw)SWRwRLR
+(1 − λ)TrR,net + rkK − I
where bellow we hint on how the domestic debt level and the NFA behave in the SS. The latter
should be consistent with the calibration of the NX (see bellow). We replace TrR,net = Trnet,
take into account that Trnet comes from Eq. (67), recall that I = δ K
LL and considera debt ratios
to GDP:






















































substitute Y by its equal from Eq. (63):
(1 − λ)CR =







































      
=Y
+[(1 − τw)SWR + (1 − λ)τwSWR − (1 − λ)(SWR − 1)]wRLR









































simplify: (1 − τw)SWR + (1 − λ)τwSWR −(1 − λ)(SWR − 1) to ((1 − τw)λSWR + 1 − λ) and re-
30See footnote 29.
39organize:
(1 − λ)CR = ̥8C
+[(1 − τw)λSWR + 1 − λ]wRLR






















































































































































































































































































now plug the latter equation into λCN = ̥5wNLN + ̥6wRLR + ̥7
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1 − ̥7       
δ K
L −̥ 7δ K














     
     
L.















































If we have had only one labor supply as in Forni et al. (2009), the labor supply for the Ricardian
agent coupled with CR = f(L) from the previous expression gives a solution for L and C. In our
case, we would have three unknowns but just two equations (CR = f(LR,LN) and CR = f(LR)
from labor supply). Therefore, we are compelled to ﬁnd the solution for a system of equations
comprising the variables: CN, CR, LN, LR, L, ΛN and ΛR and the following equations:
41
                     
                     
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, labor supply R
ΛN = (1 − βb)
 
CN (1 − b)
 −1 , UN
c
ΛR = (1 − βb)
 
CR (1 − b)














λCN + (1 − λ)CR 
, is redundant since we em-
ployed both CBCs.










































Y ∗ = T
 
α(THT)



















Y ∗ = Tα(THT)




























Y ∗ = T (THT)






















































isolating Y ∗ and assuming that RER equals 1:
Y ∗ =
 














































where C and I = δ K
L L were calculated above and we deﬁned:




(1 − α) + αT1−η















Further SS substitutions are straightforward to calculate given previous relationships.
C Steady State (incomplete asset markets)
Recall that the wedge in interest rates is one at the SS, i.e.,
exp(−φa (0) − φ∆S(0) + ln(1)) = exp(0) = 1.
This means that the relationships described in the previous section still hold.
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− gY,
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RER−η Y ∗ 1
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Y       
=Xs
− αGg − α
(C + I)
Y       
=Ms
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so Eq. (76) becomes:
Y ∗ =
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D Calvo wage and price setting
D.1 Wage Equation
D.1.1 Normal model
First, we derive the wage equation for Ricardian households. Restrictions are the relevant labor
demand faced by them is a slightly modiﬁed version of the labor demand that results from the
ﬁrm’s problem and the CBC Eq. (3). We write the Lagrangian in real terms as follows (only terms
that matter are displayed):
Et

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We diﬀerentiate it w.r.t.
˜ WR
t (h)
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taking invariant elements outside the summation:
46  ζLεLRλ
−(1+σL)
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where µWR ≡ εLR
(εLR−1) is the markup associated.













































W,t (1 − λ)








dh, which under Calvo wages is equivalent to:
DR
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in the inﬁnite summation in the RHS yields:
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DR
W,t−1 by Eq. (80)
,
DR
















































Second, we derive the wage equation for non-Ricardian households. Operating restrictions are
the labor demand faced by Non-Ricardian agents (that results from the ﬁrm’s problem) and the
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where µWN ≡ εLN
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D.1.2 Wage inﬂation model
First, we obtain the wage equation for Ricardian households. Beginning with Equation (78), mul-
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51The aggregate wage dynamics are given by:
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.
The wage dispersion is deﬁned as: DR
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into the inﬁnite sum-
mation in the RHS yields:
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Second, we obtain similar relationships for non-Ricardian households. Beginning with Equation
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The aggregate wage dynamics for non-Ricardian households are given by:
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after some manipulations we get:
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D.2 Home intermediate producers’ price setting





























































Pt+h and YH,t+h is the domestic demand of home intermediates (do not confuse




    




h  t,t+h ˜ PH,t(i)
  ˜ PH,t(i)
PH,t



















  ˜ PH,t(i)
PH,t






 ξH   Πh(1−ξH)
 −εH
YH,t+h






h  t,t+h (1 − εH)
  ˜ PH,t(i)
PH,t























































































Pt+h, and taking into account the markup deﬁnition µH ≡ εH
(εH−1):
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so that the price dynamics are given by:















D.3 Home importers Calvo pricing






































where we employ the deﬁnitions of RERF,t ≡
StP∗
F,t
PF,t , and the fact that YF,t+h ≡ CF,t+h +IF,t+h+
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so that the price dynamics are given by (recall the normalization w.r.t. PF,t):
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